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Abstract
In the climate policy debate, a rhetoric has evolved that attributes a
high potential to voluntary climate action. We turn to the population
of Germany, the fourth largest cumulative GHG emitter, to obtain an
(Internet-)representative estimate of the individual willingness to abate
one ton of CO2, the equivalent of 10 percent of annual per-capita CO2
emissions. The estimate derives from a large-scale (n=2,440) framed eld
experiment in which subjects choose between a guaranteed reduction of
one ton of EU CO2 emissions and a randomly drawn cash award between
e2 and e100. At e6.30, estimated mean WTP is considerably lower
than prior hypothetical or non-representative estimates. Median WTP is
non-positive. The almost bimodal nature of WTP in the population has
important policy implications.
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"Each and every one of us can make changes in the way we live our
lives and become part of the solution [to climate change]." Al Gore
1 Introduction
Valuing the preferences of the general public about climate change mitigation
is a key challenge in informing the climate policy debate. While the need for
decisive action on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions is now well un-
derstood among policy-makers and the public at large, the optimal design and
political feasibility of ambitious climate policies remain unclear: A global agree-
ment on a two degree ceiling on warming, for example, implies a path of emis-
sions reductions in industrialized countries that if implemented would be un-
precedented in terms of scale and pace. This amounts to a policy challenge of
new proportions as ambitious climate policies will impact on the daily lives of
ordinary citizens in a palpable way.
Within the climate policy debate, a rhetoric has evolved among inuential
commentators, climate researchers, and government bodies that attributes a
high potential to voluntary climate action. Voluntary action, it is argued,
might eliminate or at least reduce the need for coercive policies to bring about
emissions reductions (Gore and Guggenheim 2006, Pachauri 2007, European
Commission 2011). While economists are generally sceptical about the premise
that voluntary private provision might make much of a di¤erence, the empirical
evidence is less clear-cut: A number of researchers investigate the willingness to
pay (WTP) for voluntary GHG emissions reductions and nd meanWTP results
of e25 (Brouwer et al. 2008), £ 24 (MacKerron et al. 2009), or e12 (Löschel et al.
2010) per ton of individually provided GHG emissions reduction. It cannot be
ruled out, therefore, that given the opportunity, voluntary behavior might give
rise to substantial GHG emissions reductions.
Although indicating potential, there are at least three methodological rea-
sons for climate policy to be cautious about the evidence on voluntary action
so far. One is the inherent hypothetical bias of the numbers reported: So far,
research provides WTP estimates for mitigation e¤orts that are derived using
stated preferences, with the exception of Löschel et al. (2010). Estimates de-
rived by this route are important benchmarks, but inherently likely to overstate
WTP (Cummings et al. 1995, Carlsson and Martinsson 2001). Secondly, all
existing studies tend to be representative for specic subgroups of the general
population such as frequent iers passing through a specic airport (Brouwer
et al. 2008), young adults with higher education (MacKerron et al. 2009), or
residents of a specic city (Löschel et al. 2010). Understanding how the WTP
of such a subgroup relates to that of the general population is di¢ cult. Thirdly,
existing studiesparticipants faced bid prices for emissions reductions that pre-
dominantly fall in the neighborhood of current o¤set prices. However, estimates
of real marginal abatement costs are up to one order of magnitude higher (e.g.
Tol 1999, 2009, 2010).
The present paper embarks on providing the rst study of preferences for
voluntary climate action based on both non-hypothetical choices and a large and
representative sample. Specically, we report on the WTP for the abatement
of one ton of CO2 emissions. The method we employ is a large-scale framed
eld experiment. Large-scaleand framed eld experimentrefers to a num-
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ber of design choices. The term experimentinvokes the controlled setting in
which a number of subjects take a consequential decision at minimal transac-
tions costs, in this case a discrete choice between two real goods: On the one
hand a cash amount randomly drawn from an economically meaningful range of
e2 to e100 and on the other a guaranteed and veriable emissions reduction of
one ton of CO2, carried out through the documented retirement of an EU emis-
sions allowance (EUA) under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU-ETS). Framed eld experiment refers to the specic eld experimental
design, which confronts members of the public who regularly participate in in-
centivized polls with a setting that is broadly indistinguishable from a normal
polling round and which operates during their everyday routine.1 Large-scale
refers to the sample of 2,440 voting-aged subjects who are representative for
the Internet-using population of Germany, the sixth largest current and fourth
largest cumulative carbon emitter (e.g. United Nations 2011).
Our key results can be summarized as follows: First, the estimated mean
WTP for an individual emissions reduction of one ton of CO2 is e6.30. Stated
di¤erently, this mean WTP could be expected to be su¢ cient to reduce CO2
emissions in Germany by four percent. Median WTP, however, is non-positive.
This is an implication of our second result that the support of the mean WTP
is essentially a bimodal distribution: The vast majority of subjects (around 70
percent) have a non-positive WTP while a minority is willing to sacrice par-
ticularly high amounts. Thirdly, WTP strongly correlates with policy-relevant
characteristics of the subjects: The level of education, the informational status
about climate change as reected in perceptions of expected benets from to-
days emissions reductions, as well as a perceived lifestyle-related responsibility
for climate change are key predictors of a higher WTP. Voluntary action is thus
likely to increase with increased knowledge on the time structure of benets
as well as on the personal impact of actions. Fourthly, there is evidence that
exogenous environmental controls such as meterological conditions around the
time of the experiment matter for WTP estimates.
The paper proceeds as follows: We explain the experimental design consid-
erations and the experimental protocol in the following section. We then outline
the analysis in section 3 and report on data, experimental results, and the re-
sultant WTP estimates in section 4. Section 5 discusses the results, and section
6 concludes.
2 Experimental design
The basic design of the framed eld experiment is a closed-ended single-bounded
valuation question implemented under a random incentive system (Grether and
Plott 1979, Starmer and Sugden 1991, Lee 2008). Experimental subjects indi-
cate their preference between, on the one hand, a randomly drawn cash award
and, on the other, a guaranteed and veriable GHG emissions reduction of one
ton of CO2. The cash prize presented to the subject is the outcome of an
equiprobable draw from prizes between e2 and e100 in steps of e2, the upper
bound reecting an economically meaningful maximum abatement cost for CO2
emissions under a two degrees centigrade warming scenario (Tol 1999, 2009,
1We follow the taxonomy of eld experiments introduced by Harrison and List (2004).
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2010). The GHG emissions reduction is in the form of the documented retire-
ment of an emissions allowance under the EU-ETS. We use between-subjects
randomization (Baltussen et al. 2010, Abdellaoui et al. 2011, Tversky and Kah-
neman 1981) with odds of 1 in 50 that a subjects choice of either cash or emis-
sions reductions is realized. The choice is taken by an internet-representative
sample of 2,440 participants drawn from a population of approximately 65,000
panel members of an internet polling rm. Subjects received the rms standard
invitation to participate in the familiar format of a poll incentivized through a
lottery.
These basic design choices are intended to address a number of issues that
arise in the context of assessing WTP in the eld. First, the design combines
the advantages of a standard dichotomous choice format (e.g. Lusk and Hud-
son 2004, Shogren 2006) such as short administration time, limited cognitive
load, and a familiar decision situation with incentivized choices in order to
alleviate the highly problematic hypothetical bias of stated preferences meth-
ods (e.g. Cummings et al. 1995, Harrison 2006, Harrison and Rutström 2008):
Subjects face a real trade-o¤ between a guaranteed cash prize and guaranteed
emissions reductions. Emissions reductions are facilitated and o¢ cially doc-
umented through the acquisition and retiring of individually traceable EUAs.
Retiring of EUAs is an option available to all trading account holders in the ETS
and deletes the certicate from the ETS registry. As a result, a retired EUA
reduces the total amount of regulated GHG emissions from European Union by
one ton of CO2.2
Secondly, the eld experimental design combined with the large sample of
subjects enhances external validity. The sample of 2,440 subjects whose deci-
sions form the basis of this paper are representative with respect to sex, age, and
region of residence for the internet-using population of Germany, a key GHG
emitter on a global scale. The framed eld character is reinforced by administer-
ing the experiment to subjects for whom receiving an invitation to participate
in polls with a random incentive feature is normal and takes place within their
everyday routine. Also, the dichotomous choice design, accompanied with ad-
ditional survey questions and lasting for approximately ve minutes, is closely
related to a common polling format and thus not distinguishable from other
polls conducted by an internet polling rm.
Thirdly, the experimental design excludes to the greatest extent possible
confounding public or private good attributes associated with the experiment.
In order to ensure that the WTP estimated retains a narrow focus on the spe-
cic public good of GHG emissions reductions, we employ, on the one hand, a
website-based certication procedure of the EUA retirements, and we remind,
on the other hand, the subjects of the spatial indi¤erence of local GHG emissions
reductions for a global e¤ect on the climate. If subjects received EUA retire-
ment certicates in hardcopy, for example, it would plausibly increase WTP not
2The EUAs used in the experiment are Phase II emission allowances with a market price
of around e15 apiece at the time of the experiment. EUAs are the vehicle of choice for under-
standing the WTP for GHG emissions reductions since the reduction occurs in a demonstrable
and therefore credible way. In this, they di¤er from other forms of available emissions reduc-
tions certicates (e.g. Gold Standard CERs). First, the binding cap of the European
Emissions Trading System avoids problems of additionality that are often encountered for
project-based o¤sets. Second, through the systems registry, account holders can directly
observe and document the o¢ cial deletion of each allowance without the need for an interme-
diary.
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because of the GHG emissions reduction, but because of the curiosity dimension
of the good or because of private co-benets derived from an increased visibility
of the decision to others.
The fourth consideration in an valuation exercise involving GHG emissions
reduction is the informational status of subjects. This is a critical point: Empir-
ical work on the public understanding of climate change indicates that knowl-
edge among the general population about the causes and functional relationships
of climate change (Ungar 2000, Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006, Lorenzoni et al.
2007, Sterman and Sweeney 2007) and the logic underpinning climate policy
(Sinn 2008) varies considerably. Among the existing studies about WTP for in-
dividual mitigation, the amount of information about climate change provided
by the researchers di¤ers markedly. While Brouwer et al. (2008) appear to be
completely silent about causes of climate change and metrics for CO2 used,
MacKerron et al. (2009) provide a minor amount of information on the metrics,
and Löschel et al. (2010) provide information on metrics and on climate change
based on the IPCC report. Consistent with the eld experimental spirit of the
valuation elicitation, our design does not make an attempt to inform or educate
subjects on these issues before their choice. This implies that the valuation
signal of subjects is based on knowledge that may be incomplete or erroneous.
The point includes the very good that subjects are valuing: Among the possi-
ble alternatives of dening an emissions reduction we deliberately opt for the
universal and objective metric of one ton of CO2, even though subjects coming
to the experiment will di¤er in their familiarity with the metric. The rationale
for taking the information status of subjects as given and choosing a highly ob-
jective and unbiased measure is threefold: First, we circumvent the inevitable
biases, potential misinterpretations, and scientic debates about unbiased full
informationthat arise when o¤ering subjects potentially choice-relevant infor-
mation prior or during the experiment (Arrow et al. 1993, Munro and Hanley
1999). Second, the eld nature of the experiment allows subjects to collect
relevant information while the experiment is in progress (Berrens et al. 2004),
something that the choice of the universal metric deliberately facilitates and
that we can indirectly observe. Third, by trying not to confound subjectspo-
tential homegrown(Cummings et al. 1995) ignorance, we import the highly
heterogeneous information levels that exist within the population. This o¤ers on
the one hand a suitable parallel to the problem facing policy-makers today and
allows us on the other hand to examine informational status as a determinant
of WTP.
2.1 Experimental protocol
The experiment was administered using the infrastructure of YouGov, a large
Internet polling company. The recruitment of subjects followed the standard
routine of our cooperation partner in which panel members are invited via an
email message to proceed to the survey via a hypertext link. The introductory
screen explained the thematic focus of the survey, the expected duration of the
survey (ten minutes), and the use of the random incentive system with a prize
worth up to a three-digit Euro gure.3 Following the invitation screen, there
3These design criteria would have been familiar to panel members from previous polls
as they decided on whether to proceed. The polling rm regularly incentivized polls through
either a piece-rate reward of approximately e1 for 20 minutes expected survey time or random
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was a lter screen to focus on German subjects of voting age.4 Participants then
saw 10 to 13 computer screens asking for 16 to 19 choices or answers, depending
on their decisions. Median completion time was approximately 5 minutes.5
Subjects valuation was collected using two screens, one that introduced
the good to be valued and set up the choice (the information screen) and one
that explained the payment procedures and collected the choice (the decision
screen). The information screen explained three features of the experiment, (1)
the trade-o¤ between a cash prize and the CO2 emissions reduction, including
a succinct explanation of how the deletion of an EUA reliably reduces EU CO2
emissions, (2) the public good character of the emissions reduction and (3) the
random incentive system with odds of 100 in every 5,000. The decision screen
explained the consequences if the subject was drawn as a winner and triggered
a decision. Important features at this stage were transparent explanations of
how subjects that chose the cash amount would receive the award (through
their account at the polling company) and how those who chose the emissions
reductions would be able to verify that the emissions reduction had been carried
out (through an authoritative website). The bottom of the screen presented the
two prize alternatives in randomized order, including the randomly determined
subject-specic cash amount in Euro, and collected the subjects choice through
checking the preferred option.
The experiment concluded with a set of screens containing follow-up ques-
tions. For subjects that had chosen the cash prize, a screen testing for eld
price censoring (Coller and Williams 1999, Harrison et al. 2002) was inserted.
All subjects were then asked to provide estimates of the actual EUA price and
their availability to subjects outside the experiment. Another set of questions
was targeted at subjectsbeliefs about benets from todays emission reductions
as well as their perceived personal contribution to climate change. The survey
concluded with collecting specic socio-demographic information in addition to
subjects socio-demographic prole on record with the polling company.
The Internet experiment ran in two sessions in May and July 2010. Session 1
lasted from May 25th to June 2nd and generated 1,640 complete6 observations
from 1,817 invitations. Session 2 lasted from July 19th to 27th and generated 800
complete observations out of 888 invitations. Among the pooled sample of 2,440
complete observations, anwers to the open-ended questions revealed 85 subjects
who either objected to the EU-ETS as a proper method to reduce emissions
or said they distrusted the experiment itself. Following the usual procedure in
the literature, these observations were excluded from the subesequent analysis.7
The experiment was preceded by a set of pre-tests and a pilot experiment with
200 economics students in order to test the online implementation and rene
(lottery) prizes, e.g. in the form of a shopping vouchers of e25, e50, or e100. All cash awards
accrue to the subjects personal account with the polling company and can be converted into
cash as soon as a threshold of e50 is reached. The random incentive scheme was therefore
procedurally familiar.
4Subjects of other nationalities were redirected to other surveys running at the same time.
5Average completion time was 1 hour 18 minutes. This is driven by a small fraction of
surveys (about 4%) in which subjects availed themselves of the opportunity to leave the survey
and continue hours or days later.
6We count an observation as complete if the subject saw the nal dismissing screen. All
screens required an answer for each question by entering text or choosing at least one of the
options (including I dont know options) before being able to proceed to the subsequent
screen.
7Results presented are not sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of these observations.
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the set of texts and questions.
3 Analysis
Both equivalent and compensating variation, and therefore willingness to pay
(WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA), are applicable concepts for analyzing
the welfare changes in our experiment.8 Implicit in these concepts is an argu-
ment in favor of one of the two possible reference points of the comparative
statics, either of which can be defended. First, the experimental task may be
written to elicit equivalent variation, E, dened as
v(p; q1; y) = v(p; q0; y + E) (1)
where q1 and q0 denote the vector of public goods with and without the one ton
emissions reduction, respectively, y denotes income, v(p; q; y)  maxxfu(x; q)jpx 
y; x  0g is the indirect utility function, and x denotes the vector of private
goods at given prices p. Without loss of generality, we dene the correspond-
ing element of q in terms of abatement of GHG emissions. Thus, E is the
amount that would make the subject indi¤erent between increasing emissions
reductions by one ton at present income and going without the change but in-
creasing income by E. Hence, E corresponds to the minimum WTA to forgo the
emissions reduction (Hanemann 1999).9 Second, the experimental design may
also be interpreted as eliciting compensating variation and thus WTP: Whereas
equation (1) necessarily implies that the individual perceives the experimental
choice as a sale o¤er treating the emissions reduction prize as the reference
point, the converse, in which the cash prize is seen as the default option and
the experimental task resembles a purchasing decision, appears equally, if not
more plausible. In this case,
v(p; q1; y0   C) = v(p; q0; y0) (2)
denes the compensating variation with income y0 = y + c where c is the cash
prize o¤ered in the experiment. C corresponds to the maximum WTP to secure
the increase in emissions reductions (Hanemann 1999). To retain consistency
8Note that most of the reasons believed to create the frequent disparity between WTP and
WTA do not apply in our case. Following Hanemann (1999), we summarize these reasons
along three dimensions: First, a reference dependence model à la Tversky and Kahneman
(1991) will predict a WTP/WTA disparity since in the case of WTA, the situation will re-
semble a sale of the change in q while in the case of WTP, the situation will resemble a
purchase. Thus, a loss-averse individuals WTA will exceed her WTP, corresponding to the
endowment e¤ect. In our case, however, the notion of a lossis ambigious as described below.
Second, for comparable reasons, strategic behavior may induce the individual to understate
her trueWTP and overstate her trueWTA when answering open-ended survey questions
or when bidding in auctions, especially when preference uncertainty is present. Here, our
closed-ended experimental format minimizes strategic incentives (Hanemann 1999). Third, a
WTP/WTA gap may also arise in standard utility models with and without uncertainty due
to low elasticities of substitution between public and private goods and income elasticities
larger than unity. Haab and McConnell (2002) argue that when the change in q is small, the
WTP/WTA disparity should play a negligible role.
9This is true for the case where the individual likes emissions reductions, u = v(p; q1; y) 
v(p; q0; y) > 0. If the individual dislikes emissions reductions, u < 0, then  E corresponds
to the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid them (Hanemann 1999).
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with the existing literature, we subsequently adopt the framework of (2) and
report WTP.10
To calculate WTP from observed behavior, subjectsdichotomous choices
can be parametrically modeled using a random utility model (RUM) (McFadden
1974, Hanemann 1984). For our purposes, we employ a simple linear-in-income11
RUM (Haab and McConnell 2002) and write subject is indirect utility as
u0i  v(p; q0; y0i; zi) = 0zi + 0(y0i) + 0i (3)
for the case of choosing the cash prize and
u1i  v(p; q1; y0i   ci; zi) = 1zi + 1(y0i   ci) + 1i (4)
for the case of choosing the emissions reduction. zi denotes a vector of individual
characteristics and other observable attributes of the choice with parameter
vectors 0and 1 for both states of the world. 0 and 1 is marginal utility
of income in both states, and 0i and 
1
i are the respective error terms. Let g

i
denote the latent propensity to prefer the emissions reduction over cash. Then
gi = u
1
i   u0i = zi   ci + i (5)
where  = 1   0.  = 0 = 1 is assumed to be constant between both
states, and i = 1i   0i is assumed to be i.i.d. with mean zero and variance
2. In what follows, we estimate the vector of parameters (=; =) using
standard logit regressions of the observed choices, Gi =1(i chose emissions
reduction), representing gi > 0 and g

i  0, respectively. WTP is calculated the
standard way: From equations (2) and (5), WTPi = (=)zi + i= for subject
i and, in expectation and based on parameter estimates, E [WTPij; ; zi] =
[(=)=(=)] zi.
4 Data and Results
4.1 Sample properties
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of experimental variables. It includes stan-
dard socio-demographic variables, variables related to attitudes and beliefs about
climate change as stated by subjects in the follow-up questionnaire, and ex-
ogenous variables controlling for environmental conditions at the time of the
experiment.
Key socio-demographic characteristics of the Internet-representative sample
turn out to be statistically di¤erent to the characteristics of the general German
population of voting age (Table 2). As expected, the average Internet user is
more likely to be male and to be younger than the average voter. The lat-
ter also explains a positive deviation in the number of children present in the
10One potential bias that the comparative statics point to is the possible presence of a
windfall (Keeler et al. 1985) or house money (Thaler and Johnson 1990) e¤ect because
subjects always gain irrespective of their choice. Evidence on the presence, direction, and
scale of a potential bias in public good situations is inconclusive, however (Harrison 2007).
11We performed a linear grid search across Box-Cox transformations of the income variable
in our model specications and nd maxima of the log-likelihood function around  = 1.
Thus, the assumption of constant marginal utility of income between the two options seems
reasonable for our data.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables
Variable Description Mean Std. Min. Max.
Socio-demographic characteristics
Female 1 if female 0.469 0.499 0 1
Age Years 45.43 14.68 18 89
Children Number of household members
below 18
0.466 0.846 0 6
Education Years based on highest educa-
tional degree
12.27 3.214 9 22
Income Monthly household net
incomea (Euros)
2,556 1,705 450 8,000
Climate change attitudes and beliefs
Personal benets Degree of agreement to per-
sonal benets from e¤ects of
carbon emissions reductionsb
2.366 0.990 1 4
Future benets Degree of agreement to
benets for following genera-
tions from todays emissions
reductionsb
2.901 0.968 1 4
Lifestyle impact Degree of agreement that per-
sonal lifestyle has contributed
to climate changeb
2.761 0.952 1 4
Footprint estimate Estimate of yearly CO2 emis-
sions from lifestyle (tons)
3,020c 15,336 0 100,000
Footprint condence Condence in own footprint es-
timate, 1 if at least rather
sure
0.075 0.263 0 1
EUA price estimate Estimate of EUA spot price
(Euros)
1,655d 10,304 0 100,000
Price condence Condence in own EUA price
estimate, 1 if at least rather
sure
0.106 0.308 0 1
EUA availability Believes that EUAs would be
available for purchase some-
where (1 if at least rather
yes)
0.197 0.398 0 1
Environmental controls
Media coverage Number of hits in a cli-
mate change related keyword
searche in German print and
online mediaf
136.9 28.13 69.5 160
Temperature Mean ambient air tempera-
ture in subjects region of
residencef;g (C)
15.1 4.186 8.05 25.8
Notes: a In our income approximation from subjects reported income categories, for the
less than e 500category, we assume e 450. For the two categories above e 5,000, we assume
e 8,000 for compatibility with German census data. The remaining categories have widths of
e 500. b 1=no, 2=rather no, 3=rather yes, 4=yes c Median is 10 d Median is 50
e Keywords used: climate change, climate protection, global warming, carbon dioxide,
CO2. Source: LexisNexis f Average of the daily values of the day the subject took the
online experiment and the day before f Source: National Meteorological Service (DWD)
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Table 2: Socio-demographics: sample vs. census
Variable Mean values T-test (two-sided)
Experimental German census
sample data
Female 0.469 0.521 p < 0:01
(0.499) (0.500)
Age 45.43 50.05 p < 0:01
(14.68) (18.31)
Children 0.466 0.340 p < 0:01
(0.846) (0.900)
Education 12.27 11.02 p < 0:01
(3.214) (3.01)
Income 2,556 4,057 p < 0:01
(1,705) (1,170)
Income  5; 000 2,205 2,150 p < 0:05
(1,030) (1,300)
Notes: Standard errors are in parantheses. Source: Federal Statistical
O¢ ce (Destatis), Mikrozensus 2008, 2009, EVS 2008 and own computa-
tions
household when comparing our sample and the German population average.
In the household income category, both very low and very high incomes are
slightly underrepresented: While mean income in the census data is higher,12
the di¤erence reverses if one drops incomes above e5,000.13
Subjectsstated views regarding climate change in Table 1 support the pic-
ture of generally concerned citizens with some understanding about the physical
inertia of the climate problem but varying awareness regarding the metric in-
volved. A majority accepts that their lifestyle is contributing to climate change
and understands that current emissions reductions do not benet themselves
but instead constitute an intertemporal benet transfer to future generations.
The evidence on the understanding of the metrics is mixed: While the median
subject provides a surprisingly close estimate to the yearly per-capita carbon
emissions in Germany (about 10 tons), a number of subjects has di¢ culties in
giving a reasonable estimate, and only 7.5 percent feel at least somewhat certain
about their guess. A similar pattern arises for estimates of spot prices of EU
emissions allowances. Regarding respondentswillingness to improve on their
information status during the survey (e.g. Berrens et al. 2004), we nd ten-
tative evidence against substantial information acquisition (e.g. by consulting
Internet resources before the decision on the prize or answering knowledge ques-
tions) during the online experiment: There is no discernible link between the
time subjects took to take the relevant decisions, the nature of their decision, or
the level of understanding of the policy context (Diederich and Goeschl 2011).
Environmental controls on media coverage and outside air temperature were
obtained through a media database keyword search (LexisNexis) and through
data from the National Weather Service (DWD), respectively, and matched to
subjects. Both variables reect the average of the values of the day at which the
subject decided to start the experimental survey and the day before. In order
12 Income categories above e5,000 were checked by six percent in our sample, while census
data indicates a share of around 19 percent.
13While these deviations play an insignicant role in the subsequent analysis, caution seems
to be generally advised when dealing with results by the Internet-based polling industry that
are sometimes quoted as representative for the population.
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Table 3: Empirical probability distribution of WTP
Cash prize intervala [2,10] [12, 20] [22, 30] [32, 40] [42, 50]
# of cash choices 163 171 208 214 198
# of reduction choices 64 53 34 28 28
% WTP  cash prize 28.2 23.7 14.0 11.6 12.4
[34.1, 22.3] [29.3, 18.1] [18.5, 9.6] [15.6, 7.5] [16.7, 8.1]
Cash prize intervala [52, 60] [62, 70] [72, 80] [82, 90] [92, 100]
# of cash choices 206 218 201 207 187
# of reduction choices 32 40 32 36 35
% WTP  cash prize 13.4 15.5 13.7 14.8 15.8
[17.8, 9.1] [19.9, 11.1] [18.2, 9.3] [19.3, 10.3] [20.6, 10.9]
Notes: 95 percent condence intervals in square brackets. a Each cash prize interval pools
observations from ve cash prize amounts
to verify the robustness of the media coverage variable, we used two mutually
exclusive sets of keywords who turned out to be highly correlated (correlation
coe¢ cient 0.81). Note that the Germany-wide media data varies with time only
while the temperature data is specic to the time of completing the experiment
as well as the subjects region of residence.
The dependent variable in the subsequent analysis is the subjects choice of
a prize. In total, 382 (16.2 percent) out of 2,355 subjects chose the emissions
reduction through the retirement of an EUA. 1,973 (83.8 percent) chose the cash
amount that was o¤ered to them. Table 3 summarizes subjectsprize choices for
cash prize intervals pooling the choices of ve amounts in each column. It can be
seen that the elasticity with respect to the cash prize appears low as one would
expect in the case of contributions to a public good (Green 1992, Diederich
and Goeschl 2011). The average probability that subjects choose the emissions
reduction prize does not exceed 30 percent for the lowest prize category and lies
around 15 percent for the highest.
Field price censoring (FPC) is a potentially important source of bias in val-
uation experiments. FPC can arise in valuation experiments because prices for
goods within the experiment cannot easily be isolated from prices of those same
goods or close substitutes in the real world (Harrison et al. 2004, Cherry et al.
2004). As a result, there are circumstances when the experimentally observable
WTP is censored at the level of the real-world price as subjects avail themselves
of arbitrage opportunities. Careful examination of the data leads us to conclude
that FPC is an unlikely source of bias in the present experiment. Here, FPC
were present if a subject with a reservation price for emissions reductions ri
accepts the experimental cash prize ci even though ri > ci simply because the
eld price of emissions reductions f^i estimated by the subject obeys ci > f^i.14
In cases then where ri > ci > f^i, the experimenter may mistakenly conclude
that the unobservable reservation price ri is smaller than ci on the basis of the
subject choosing cash instead of the good and therefore systematically under-
state WTP. In our data, FPC with respect to perfect substitutes does not play
14Since there is no secondary market for retired EUAs, we need not be concerned about the
situation f^i > ci > ri in which subjects opt for the EUA despite ri < ci in order to pocket
the arbitrage margin f^i   ci:
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a signicant role: Only 10.6 percent of subjects feel at least somewhat informed
about the true EUA price, and only 6.2 (13.5) percent of subjects condently
(tentatively) believe that they would personally have access to the EUA mar-
ket. Excluding potentially eld price censored subjects of these groups from the
analysis does not alter results signicantly. Evidence on FPC with respect to
imperfect substitutes such as o¤sets or costly behavior that reduces emissions
reductions is less clear-cut. The possibility of imperfect substitutes is often
overlooked in valuation experiments (Cherry et al. 2004). We adopt the de-
brieng questionnaire strategy of preceding papers (Coller and Williams 1999,
Harrison et al. 2002) as an ex post choice lter to detect subjects constrained
by any type of FPC from revealing that ri > ei. These debrieng responses
are inconsistent with FPC.15 In sum, we nd little evidence that awareness of
outside opportunities introduces a substantial downward-bias in the results.
4.2 Parameter estimates
Table 4 reports the results of the Logit regressions of the prize choices for three
di¤erent specications. Parameter estimates and signicance levels are highly
robust across specications.16
Starting with the price variable (Cash prize), the coe¢ cient on the experi-
mental cost of reduction has the desired negative sign and is signicant at the
one percent level across model specications. Among the socio-demographic
variables, neither sex nor age nor the number of children in the household is
signicant. The level of education, however, is a robust determinant that is
highly signicant across all specications. Income cancels out in a linear-in-
income RUM and therefore is not included as regressor. If included, the variable
turns out to be insignicant.17 In contrast to the socio-demographic characteris-
tics, the majority of attitudinal variables contributes to explaining the subjects
choices in favor of the emissions reduction: The expectation of beneting per-
sonally from emissions reductions, the expectation of beneting following gener-
ations, and an acknowledgement of a personal contribution to climate change all
raise the propensity of a subject to choose the EUA retirement. Informational
variables such as an estimate of the carbon footprint and the perceived avail-
ability of EUAs to ordinary consumers fail to deliver individually. However, we
nd that those who feel more condent about the estimates they are asked for
have a signicantly di¤erent propensity to choose the emissions reduction. The
e¤ects, decreasing for higher certainty about the carbon footprint estimate and
increasing for higher certainty about the EUA price estimate, are as one might
expect them for subjects who, on average, overestimate both their footprint
(which would imply a smaller benet from the one ton reduction) and the EUA
spot price (which would imply a better deal at given experimental prices).18
An additional result among the informational variables is that when subjects
expect higher EUA eld prices, they are more likely to choose the experimental
15 In particular, the propensity to claim to be subject to a FPC constraint decreases in the
cash prize. For a more detailled analysis, see Diederich and Goeschl (2011).
16A probit approach returns comparable results for the covariates employed (Diederich and
Goeschl 2011).
17Compare footnote 11.
18 In fact, closer inspection using interaction e¤ects shows that the e¤ect of condence in the
carbon footprint is driven by a small fraction of subjects who strongly acknowledge lifestyle-
related negative contributions.
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Table 4: Logit parameter estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Cash prize -0.0074*** -0.0079*** -0.0072***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female 0.1572 0.1420 
(0.134) (0.137)
Age 0.0032 0.0010 
(0.005) (0.005)
Children -0.0777 -0.0777 
(0.082) (0.085)
Education 0.0871*** 0.0911*** 0.0869***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Personal benets 0.2385*** 0.2500*** 0.2401***
(0.090) (0.093) (0.088)
Future benets 0.4753*** 0.4748*** 0.4633***
(0.109) (0.112) (0.108)
Lifestyle impact 0.2849*** 0.2816*** 0.2905***
(0.090) (0.093) (0.089)
Footprint estimate -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.000) (0.000)
Footprint condence -1.0787*** -1.0743*** -1.0880***
(0.300) (0.309) (0.298)
EUA price estimatea 0.0107** 0.0115** 0.0107**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Price condence 0.4515** 0.4426** 0.4064*
(0.212) (0.221) (0.209)
EUA availability -0.0640 -0.0329 
(0.153) (0.157)
Media coverage 0.0009 0.0005 
(0.002) (0.005)
Temperature 0.0315* -0.0129 0.0269*
(0.016) (0.044) (0.015)
Constant -5.9940*** -5.2568*** -5.6235***
(0.700) (1.132) (0.461)
Day e¤ects No Yes No
Daytime e¤ects No Yes No
Region e¤ects No Yes No
N 1898.000 1898.000 1900.000
Log-likelihood -786.248 -762.996 -790.003
2 202.765 249.268 199.100
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.140 0.112
Notes: Dependant variable: 1 if subject chose the emissions reduction,
0 if subject chose the cash. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***
Signicant at or below 1 percent ** Signicant at or below 5 percent
* Signicant at or below 10 percent a In Thousands of Euros
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emissions reduction. However, since price estimates are stated after the valua-
tion choice, endogeneity might be an issue. A nal contribution to explaining
the observed variation in subjectschoices comes from the matched exogenous
environmental controls: Higher mean temperatures in subjectsregions of res-
idence are associated with a higher propensity to opt for the GHG emissions
reduction (p = 0:056). The e¤ect is robust to including maximum instead of
mean temperatures at the ten percent level of signicance. A comparable e¤ect
for media coverage of the climate change issue cannot be established. Including
xed e¤ects for the day the subject took part in the experiment and the region
of residence naturally eliminates identication of the matched environmental
controls. All other parameter estimates are highly robust to the inclusion of
xed e¤ects.
4.3 WTP results
The empirical distribution of WTP in Table 3 illustrates an interesting phenom-
enon: Despite a price range that is considerably larger than previous studies,
fat tailsare still present in our data. WTP estimates are therefore likely to be
sensitive to assumed bounds or distributional assumptions. Several assumptions
are crucial in the presence of fat tailswhen experimental prices do not cover the
tails of the empirical distribution (e.g. Hanemann and Kanninen 1999, Haab and
McConnell 2002): One assumption concerns the possibility of negative WTP.
The simple linear RUM does not distinguish between WTP and WTA, i.e. neg-
ative WTP,19 when tting the distribution of WTP. A frequent approach when
free-disposal of the environmental change can be assumed is to bound WTP
from below at zero. For the case of greenhouse gas emissions reductions, free
disposal cannot be assumed ex ante, and the presence of negative WTP is an
empirical matter. Our data provides little evidence on negative WTP. When
asked about the reason for choosing the cash prize, only two of 1,973 subjects
expressed some disutility from the emissions reduction20 in an open-ended an-
swer possibility. By contrast, 71 percent expect some future generation benets
from the reduction, 45 percent some personal benets. A second assumption
concerns the possibility of indi¤erent subjects. Since the linear model assumes
a continuous transition from utility increase to decrease,21 it excludes the pos-
siblity of a point mass at zero from subjects who simply do not care about the
proposed environmental change, v(p; q0; y0i; zi) = v(p; q
1; y0i; zi). From a theo-
retical perspective, indi¤erence is likely to be present when one wants to value
contributions to public goods since free riding behavior will probably be ex-
pressed through zero WTP. In our data, 60 of 1,973 subjects can be plausibily
related to indi¤erence from their stated reasons for choosing cash.22 However,
19 If the individual dislikes emissions reductions, u < 0, then  C in eq. (2) corresponds
to the maximum willingness to accept (WTA) for the emissions reduction (Hanemann 1999,
Hanemann and Kanninen 1999). Following a frequent abuse of terminology, we will sometimes
speak of negative WTP when referring to this WTA.
20Main arguments included harmful consequences for the economy. Since the survey did
not provide an anwer category related to negative utility and subjects were not forced to use
the open-ended answer option, this number may understate the presence of negative WTP in
the sample.
21Note that the error term on the utility di¤erence in eq. (5) is assumed to have innite
support.
22Approximately half of these statements expresses doubts about climate change itself,
about one third indicates variants of free-riding behavior (other individuals, the government,
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since the survey did not provide an I dont care answer category and sub-
jects were not forced to use the open-ended answer option, this number may
understate the true number of indi¤erent subjects.
In Table 5, we report two types of WTP estimates, one derived through the
linear RUM and one based on the non-parametric Turnbull estimator that as-
sumes non-negativity but allows for indi¤erence. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5
show RUM based WTP estimates for Models (1) and (3) of Table 4. Condence
intervals were calculated using the Krinsky and Robb (1986) procedure and the
WTPCIKR package in STATA (Jeanty 2007). Columns (1) and (2) show that
the linear RUM predicts negative expected WTP (EWTP) for a large part of the
sample including calibrations of the explanatory variables at the sample mean
and the mean socio-demographic census values. As contribution rates are below
50 percent even for the lowest experimental prices, the unbounded distribution
of WTP in the linear RUM puts the bulk of the probability mass below the range
of prices covered in the experiment, predicting expected WTP way below zero.
Table 5 also provides examples for more extreme calibrations of attitudinal and
socio-demographic variables to illustrate the e¤ect of covariates on WTP. A pos-
itive EWTP is obtained for calibrations where education is higher than average
and where subjectsvector of beliefs is (unrealistically) large and enthusiastic.
The e¤ect of the attitudinal variables in the data is strong enough so that a
more realistic calibration in which a well-informed subject acknowledges future
benets and personal lifestyle impacts but not personal benets from todays
reductions still increases WTP considerably compared to the sample mean.
Column (3) in Table 5 provides the non-parametric WTP estimates that
assume non-negativity of WTP but allow for indi¤erence in the sample. Given
the empirical evidence on indi¤erence versus negative WTP in our data and
the theoretical reasons to expect free riding, these assumptions appear more
plausible than the huge amount of probability mass assigned to negative WTP
by the linear RUM. Estimates are derived using the Turnbull Distribution-Free
Estimator (Turnbull 1976, Haab and McConnell 1997). In contrast to paramet-
ric spike models (Hanemann and Kriström 1995, Kriström 1997) the Turnbull
estimator has the advantage that indi¤erent subjects do not need to be uniquely
identied (Haab and McConnell 1997).23 We report lower bound estimates of
expected WTP using the most conservative version of the Turnbull estimator,
which relies only on the information that the WTP of a subject who chose the
reduction is not less than the alternative cash prize. Mean EWTP for a one
ton GHG emissions reduction is estimated at e6.30 with a standard error of
e0.76. Median EWTP is zero. Estimates for subsamples consisting of enthu-
siastsor realistsare considerably higher at about e22 and e17, respectively.
One drawback of the Turnbull estimator is that in order to investigate covariate
e¤ects, one needs to split the sample into subsamples of the covariate calibra-
tions. Thus, more observations in the education cells within these calibrations
would be required to calculate meaningful estimates for the other calibrations.
rms, or countries should move rst), and the remaining cases explicitely fall into the dont
care category.
23The assumption is that subjects with v(p; q0; y0i; zi) = v(p; q
1; y0i; zi) choose cash at all
prices ci > 0.
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Table 5: Expected WTP for one ton of reduced CO2
Model (1) Model (3) Turnbull LB
At sample mean e -191.61 e -196.70 e 6.31
[-556.73, -99.29] [-562.15, -101.71] (0.76)
At German census average e -203.50 e -213.91 
[-587.25, -106.59] [-606.93, -112.53]
At example calibrations of variables:a
Enthusiast e -24.01 e -25.23 e 22.21b
(Personal benets=4, Future [-144.75, 14.00] [-152.72, 13.07] (2.64)
benets=4, Lifestyle impact=4)
Enthusiastwith college degree e 17.61 e17.37 
[-51.40, 52.34] [-55.92, 52.72]
Enthusiastwith university degree e 41.05 e 41.38 
[-15.31, 86.61] [-16.05, 88.72]
Enthusiastwith Ph.D. e 87.91 e 89.41 
[32.56, 190.38] [33.08, 192.83]
Realist e -120.28 e -124.73 e 16.87b
(Personal benets=1, Future [-393.38, -37.51] [-412.34, -40.15] (6.71)
benets=4, Lifestyle impact=4)
Realistwith college degree e -78.65 e -82.14 
[-297.47, -6.57] [-316.00, -7.98]
Realistwith university degree e -55.22 e -58.12 
[-243.04, 15.68] [-256.59, 13.57]
Realistwith Ph.D. e -8.36 e -10.09 
[-144.27, 70.48] [-157.11, 67.60]
Notes: 95 percent condence intervals in square brackets. Standard errors are in parantheses.
a Values of explanatory variables not listed are sample means b Values are derived by pooling
answer categories 1 and 2 as well as 3 and 4 of the three variables to reduce variance
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5 Interpretation of results
How do our ndings compare to those of previous studies using alternative
methodologies? We o¤er a comparison and a discussion of the most salient
policy implications in what follows. Drawing on the existing published and
yet unpublished literature, Table 6 summarizes available results on mean and
median WTP as well as on selected determinants of WTP identied in Tables 4
and 5. The papers included here comprise both the small set of existing studies
on WTP for individual emissions reductions and papers that examine WTP for
collective climate policies.24 Including the latter allows a comparison of how
covariates of WTP for collective climate action relate to those of individual
WTP.
Table 6 reports the lower bound Turnbull estimate of the mean WTP derived
from the data. This choice of estimate not only reects its greater plausibility
over and above the RUM estimates, but also facilitate comparison with those
in the existing literature.25 Mean WTP estimates for o¤setting emissions from
air travel are provided by Brouwer et al. (2008) and MacKerron et al. (2009) at
e25/tCO2 and £ 24/tCO2, respectively.26 Both estimates draw on stated pref-
erences rather than observed choices, providing one explanation for the larger
gures. Also, both studies rely on considerably smaller samples than ours,
each consisting of a subgroup of the population that in light of the results
on covariates is likely to exhibit a larger than average WTP.27 MacKerron
et al. (2009) note that their data shows a fat tail above their maximum bid of
£ 20 which is in line with our observation of a signicant density of WTP at
higher prices. Löschel et al. (2010) conducted a framed eld experiment on the
individual demand for EUAs using a variant of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak
mechanism. Within their sample of 202 local residents, 62 percent revealed
zero or negative WTP by not demanding any emissions reductions at any price.
While this is in line with our nding of a large share of non-positive WTP, the
authors report a somewhat higher mean WTP of about e12. Since their design
allowed the purchase of multiple units of EUAs rather than one unit as in this
design, a comparison of the WTP is likely to understate the di¤erences in WTP
measured. Sampling issues (size, region) and design choices (such as an exper-
imenter demand e¤ect and the information provision) are possible sources. In
particular, one obvious source of di¤erences in the level of WTP are alternative
approaches with respect to subjectsinformation status: While this experiment
does not manipulate the information status of subjects, Löschel et al. (2010)
deliberately inform as well as question subjects about climate change prior to
their purchase decision. Despite the di¤erences in the level of WTP, there are
important common features across the empirical ndings so far, irrespective of
24The selection of papers is based on comparability of the valued scenario and availability
of covariates. See Johnson and Nemet (2010) for a more comprehensive survey of the growing
literature on WTP for climate policy.
25Both MacKerron et al. (2009) and Löschel et al. (2010) constrain WTP from below at
zero: Brouwer et al. (2008) employ the Turnbull estimator while in Löschel et al. (2010), WTP
is restricted to fall between e0 and e40. Both papers do not provide empirical evidence on
these assumptions. MacKerron et al. (2009) use a linear RUM and do not restrict WTP.
26Brouwers et al. (2008) estimate is calculated from a distance-based estimate of e0.6 for
every 100km own.
27Brouwers et al. (2008) sample consists of 349 air travel passengers while MacKerron et al.
(2009) sample 321 young adults with higher education.
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the extent of information provision by the experimenter: These are, e.g., the
presence of fat tails (MacKerron et al. 2009, Löschel et al. 2010) and a large
share of non-contributors (Löschel et al. 2010). Our results share these features,
adding further robustness. At the same time, the issue of information status
clearly merits further investigation.
The present study benets from access to a larger set of variables to study
covariates than most existing studies on WTP for individual or collective climate
action. Among socio-demographic variables, education stands out as signicant
driver in our results and conrms its role among subject characteristics in stated
preferences research. The e¤ect of education may, in part, proxy for other
drivers not accounted for, such as subjectscognitive ability. In contrast to our
ndings, income is positively correlated in most cases where available. Since
income is invariably self-reported, rm conclusions are di¢ cult to draw.28 . In
the voluntary contribution context, some researchers have found that gender
and age matter: There, being female and being older is positively correlated
with pro-social behavior (List 2004). In this experiment, neither gender nor
age are signicant. This is closer to the unequivocal ndings on gender and age
e¤ects in the literature. A possible explanation for the absence of gender and age
e¤ect may be countervailing e¤ects in both variables that are specic to climate
change: On the one hand, climate change may a¤ect genders asymmetrically.
On the other, the delayed arrival of benets from emissions reductions may
militate against older subjects contributing.29 Consistent across papers is the
insignicant e¤ect of the number of children on WTP.
The second panel of covariates in Table 4 reports on the e¤ects of stated cli-
mate change attitudes, in particular, benet expectations and the acknowledge-
ment of having personally contributed to climate change. Making the benet
variables comparable across the literature involves some imprecise adjustments.
For example, some studies phrase benets of emissions reductions as benets,
some as avoided climate change impacts. For the sake of comparison, we treat
these as equivalent, even though there are some di¤erences in substance. On a
related point, our paper divides benets into separate dimensions of personal
and future generation benets. Most of the existing literature lumps the two
dimensions together. For the sake of comparison, we follow the majority of
papers by reporting both variables jointly. Once these adjustments are made,
the almost equivocal nding is that of a positive correlation between benets
and WTP. Regarding subjectsacknowledgement of a personal contribution to
climate change, we nd strong evidence that such an acknowledgement drives
WTP. This strengthens previous ndings in the literature: Brouwer et al. (2008)
nd a signicant e¤ect of travellersperception of their own responsibility for
climate change on their WTP for o¤sets per ight. Cai et al. (2010) nd WTP to
be driven by the allocation of cost shares for a mitigation policy, both domestic
and international. In particular, WTP is higher when the incidence is larger for
parties perceived as more responsible for climate change. The latter reason also
28With a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.29 between income and education, multicollinearity
does not appear to be an issue.
29 It is therefore interesting to look at gender-specic e¤ects of covariates. Using a split-
sample approach, we nd that older men are signicantly more likely to choose the emissions
reduction while for females, age is insignicant. With respect to climate change attitudes,
females choices are insignicantly correlated to the expectations of personal benets while
for males, correlation with the acknowledged lifestyle impact is insignicant.
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resonates ndings by, for example, Bulte et al. (2005) on an outragepremium
on WTP for human-made environmental damages.
A novel element in the present study is the inclusion of exogenous controls
for environmental conditions at the time and location of the valuation choice. So
far, temperature e¤ects as well as the e¤ects of media coverage have been based
on respondentsstated perceptions. While we cannot identify an e¤ect of media
coverage, the possible link between ambient temperature and WTP suggests an
interesting and plausible physiological pathway between environmental factors
and economic choices. However, the temperature e¤ect uncovered here could be
either context-specic or a generic phenomenon. If the e¤ect is specic, a possi-
ble explanation might be a heuristic shortcut that associates lower GHG emis-
sions with lower temperatures, making emissions reductions without further
reasoning appear instantaneously more desirable. At this stage and without
further evidence, however, such reasoning is entirely speculative.
Our eld-experimental results are based on a large sample of the general
population. A simple extrapolation would imply that a large majority of the
population is unwilling to provide a substantial contribution to climate change
mitigation on a voluntary basis. There are grounds, however, to expect well-
dened subgroups within the population to willingly incur signicant sacrices
in order to reduce GHG emissions. The question that arises then is how much
those subgroups will deliver in aggregate to society. Consider the following
thought experiment. At current carbon prices and assuming perfect price dis-
crimination,30 the elicited mean WTP would be su¢ cient to reduce emissions
by at least 0.4 tons per individual. Given a yearly per-capita CO2 footprint of
around 10 tons (United Nations 2011), our eld experiment predicts a one-shot
aggregate WTP among the population su¢ cient to reduce at least 4% of annual
German emissions. Given current policy targets, this amount of potential vol-
untary commitment is substantial, but not as ambitious as prior estimates have
suggested.
6 Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was the tension between political rhetoric and
empirical evidence regarding voluntary GHG abatement by the public. The
rhetoric emphasizes the need for individual action to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. However, there is at present little empirical evidence to what extent
the public is willing to engage in such individual action, and what the nature
of such a willingness would likely be. The contribution of this paper is to ad-
dress this tension by providing a non-hypothetical measure of the willingness to
pay of a representative sample of the population of Germany, the worlds fourth
largest cumulative greenhouse gas emitter, for the voluntarily provision of a spe-
cic amount of abatement activities (1 ton of CO2) when such a provision incurs
zero transaction costs. Our headline results demonstrate that harnessing indi-
vidual action for emission reductions faces a number of important challenges. In
terms of the level of WTP, the mean WTP for the voluntary abatement of one
ton of CO2 is estimated at e6.30 under the optimistic, but plausible assumption
that WTP is bounded from below at e0. So even under benign circumstances,
30The EUA spot price was around e13 at the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Sep-
tember 2011.
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non-hypothetical WTP is considerably lower than the stated-preference esti-
mates available in the literature so far. More challenging yet, the best estimate
of median WTP for abating a ton of CO2 emissions is non-positive. Combin-
ing the observations on the mean and the median WTP points to important
heterogeneities within the population. These give rise to an essentially bimodal
distribution of WTP: While the majority in the population is not willing to incur
economic sacrices to provide emissions abatement on a voluntary basis, a small
minority of around 15 percent is within the experimental cost range willing
to do so almost irrespective of the price. Any attempt to galvanize the public
into action will therefore need to target that specic subset of the population
that makes a signicant contribution, despite its small size. The distribution of
WTP in the population follows a number of empirical regularities that facilitate
such targeting. Prime among these is the importance of education for predicting
WTP as well as attitudes about climate change and personal responsibility that
are in part subject to informational status, plus the surprising nding on
meteorological conditions at the time of the experiment. These ndings provide
obvious points of departure for subsequent research: The link between informa-
tional status and WTP, the relationship between WTP and ambient variables,
and the challenge of targeting without inducing motivation crowding are only
three dimensions for further study.
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A Appendix
A.1 Experimental screens: translations into English
A.1.1 Welcome screen
Dear participants,
we would like to invite you to participate in two lotteries and to
answer some questions about CO2-emissions and climate change.
Your participation will take approximately ten minutes. In the
lotteries, you have the chance to win points worth up to a three-digit
amount in euros.
As usual, all your information will be treated condentially.
A.1.2 Citizenship screen
Of which country do you hold citizenship?
In case you hold more than one, please tick all applicable boxes!
A.1.3 Information Screen
In the lotteries, you may choose between the following two
prizes:
A cash prize in points
or
the reduction of carbon (CO2) emissions by 1 ton
How will the reduction of the CO2 emissions take place? We will
make use of a reliable opportunity provided by the EU emissions
trading system: We will purchase and delete an EU emissions al-
lowance for you. Emissions allowances are needed by power plants
and other large installations within the EU in order to be allowed to
emit CO2. Since there is only a xed overall amount of allowances
in place, deleted ones are no longer available to facilitate emissions.
Emissions in Germany and other EU countries decrease by exactly
one ton through one deleted allowance.
Because of the way in which CO2 mixes in the air, it does not
matter for the e¤ect on the climate where CO2 emissions are reduced.
What counts is only total emissions worldwide.
In the lotteries, 100 winners will be randomly selected out of
about 5,000 participants. The following two lotteries may di¤er in
the prizes o¤ered as well as in the payo¤ procedures.
A.1.4 Decision Screen
In this lottery, you have the choice between the two prizes listed
below.
 If you choose the cash amount and win, then the corresponding amount
of points will be transferred to your points account within the next few
days. All winners will receive a short notication email.
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 The deletion of emissions allowances will, in this lottery, take place as a
collective order for all winners. For every winner who chooses the emissions
reduction one additional allowance will be deleted. Winners will receive
a short notication email containing a hyperlink to Heidelberg University
webpages where they can reliably verify the deletion.
Please choose now, which prize you prefer if drawn as
winner:
( ) The reduction of CO2 emissions by one ton through the deletion of one
EU emissions allowance
( ) 46 Euro31 in bonus points
A.1.5 FPC lter question
Please give now any particulars as to why you chose the amount
in euros. In order to do this, please tick all applicable boxes. Please
answer spontaneously.
( ) Given the two prizes, I did not want to forgo the chance of winning 46
euros.
( ) I assume that there is another possibility for me to reduce CO2-emissions
by one ton for less than 46 euros.
( ) There were other reasons as to why I chose the amount of euros, namely:
_________
A.1.6 Introduction follow-up questions
Thank you. On the following pages we would like to ask you
some concluding questions.
A.1.7 Follow-up questions
What is your estimate of the current market price for one ton of
CO2 in the EU emissions trading system?
____ euros
How sure are you about your estimate?
( ) I know the price
( ) Very sure
( ) Rather sure
( ) Rather unsure
( ) Very unsure
( ) I dont know
31Example amount. The order in which the two prizes appeared was randomized.
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A.1.8 Follow-up questions
In this lottery, EU emission allowances are bought and deleted
by the organizer. Do you think that there exists a possibility for you
to personally buy and delete EU emissions allowances?
( ) Yes
( ) Rather yes
( ) Rather no
( ) No
( ) I dont know
Do you think that you will personally benet from positive e¤ects
of reduced CO2 emissions (for example from the mitigation of climate
change)?
( ) [Same answer options as above]
Do you think that future generations in Germany (for instance
your children and grand-children) will benet if climate change miti-
gating CO2 emissions reductions are undertaken in the present time?
( ) [Same answer options as above]
Do you think that your personal behavior or lifestyle has con-
tributed or is contributing to climate change?
( ) [Same answer options as above]
A.1.9 Follow-up questions
What is your estimate of the yearly CO2 emissions caused by
your lifestyle?
____ tons
How sure are you about your estimate?
( ) I had the emissions calculated
( ) Very sure
( ) Rather sure
( ) Rather unsure
( ) Very unsure
( ) I dont know
A.1.10 Follow-up questions
Do you consciously act in a climate-protecting way? If yes, please
list some forms of behavior, decisions and measures through which
you have consciously contributed or are contributing to the reduction
of CO2 or other greenhouse gases (in keywords).
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A.1.11 Enquiry of socio-demographic information (if not or only
partially on record)
Please state your gender.
( ) male
( ) female
In what year were you born? ___
How many children under 18 live in your household? ___
A.1.12 Enquiry of socio-demographic information if not on record
What is your highest educational degree?
( ) Still in school
( ) Special-needs school
( ) Elementary secondary school (Hauptschule, 9th grade)
( ) Polytechnic school of the GDR (10th grade)
( ) Highschool (Realschule, 10th grade)
( ) Advanced technical college entrance qualication
( ) A-levels (12th or 13th grade)
( ) Advanced technical college (Diploma (advanced technical college), Bach-
elor, Master)
( ) University degree (diploma, magister, bachelor, master)
( ) Ph.D.
( ) Dropout
( ) No specication
What is the overall net income of the household that you live in?
( ) under EUR 500
( ) from EUR 500 up to EUR 1000
( ) from EUR 1000 up to EUR 1500
( ) from EUR 1500 up to EUR 2000
( ) from EUR 2000 up to EUR 2500
( ) from EUR 2500 up to EUR 3000
( ) from EUR 3000 up to EUR 3500
( ) from EUR 3500 up to EUR 4000
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( ) from EUR 4000 up to EUR 4500
( ) from EUR 4500 up to EUR 5000
( ) from EUR 5000 up to EUR 10000
( ) EUR 10000 and more
( ) no specication
A.1.13 Closing screen
Dear participant,
Thank you very much for your participation in this survey. If
you are one of the winners, we will contact you by e-mail shortly.
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